Abstract
Introduction

21
nothing could be considered safe, making safety a meaningless concept. There is no sharp line between 1 safe and unsafe because safety has meaning on a relative basis. Finally, each person has an individual 2 notion of safety that may vary from one risk to another. We propose a pragmatic notion of safety as "a 3 level of risk so negligible that a reasonable, well-informed individual need not be concerned about it, nor 4 find any rational basis to change his/her behaviour to avoid such a small, but non-zero risk". This notion 5 was first articulated in the context of addressing whether there could be a safe dose for exposure to a 6 carcinogen, an example that squarely confronts the distinction between safety and zero risk (Hrudey & 7 Krewski, 1995). More recently, the issue of what constitutes safe drinking water was addressed for Part 2 8 of the Walkerton Inquiry (Canada) that was charged with recommending how a disaster like the 9 Walkerton drinking water disease outbreak, which killed seven and made 2,300 ill, could be prevented 10 from re-occurring in Ontario (O'Connor, 2002b) . A similar notion of drinking water safety was adopted.
11
In the context of drinking water, and given our current capability for reducing risk, this notion of 12 safe drinking water should mean that we do not expect to die or become seriously ill from drinking or 13 using it. Assuring that drinking water is essentially free (to negligible levels) from the risk of infectious 14 disease can be, and largely has been, achieved for most public water supplies in affluent nations. The 19 The Walkerton Inquiry described some essential characteristics of risk management as: 20 • "being preventive rather than reactive;
Characteristics of risk management for safe drinking water
21
• distinguishing greater risks from lesser ones and dealing first with the former;
22
• taking time to learn from experience; and (ii) a decision could be made not to act, when there is truly a need -a false negative error.
5
These types of errors can be illustrated by reference to some of the cases reviewed below. The 1998
6
Sydney water crisis has been described as a case of issuing a boil water alert for Sydney residents on the 7 basis of erroneous monitoring results (Clancy, 2000) , making that decision a false positive error. in series can offer orders of magnitude (log) levels of protection to the drinking water supply. The level We performed an analysis of the major factors contributing to drinking water disease outbreaks 14 by searching electronically and through bibliographic cross-referencing the published English language 15 literature over the past 30 years. We screened papers for those that discussed specific disease outbreaks 16 in affluent nations and which described some of the failure modes contributing to the outbreak. We did 17 not attempt to review all outbreaks. There was substantial variation in the quality and detail of the 18 description of failure mechanisms among the papers that we retrieved. In all, over 70 case studies were 19 prepared from this database and are analyzed in detail elsewhere (Hrudey & Hrudey, 2004 have provided earlier warning to initiate a boil water advisory. In this case, the boil water advisory was 10 issued almost five days after the first signs of illness.
11
The 1989 Cabool outbreak was caused by sewage contamination of drinking water in the 12 distribution system during water main break repairs following unseasonably cold weather. The 13 distribution system in this community was in poor repair and vulnerable to sewage contamination, while 14 the sewer system was in worse condition experiencing regular sewer back-ups and overflows. The The 1993 Gideon fatal outbreak was caused by poor maintenance of water storage facilities that 6 allowed bird fecal contamination that was flushed into the distribution system during an effort to flush the 7 system because of water quality complaints. Like Cabool, this community had a high quality groundwater 8 supply feeding into a poorly maintained distribution system without any treatment barrier. Finally, to assure everyone concerned that the systems are functioning as they should be, there 8 must be review processes. These include periodic evaluation of long-term performance and an external 9 audit of drinking water quality management performance. All must be subject to review by senior 10 management for evaluation in view of the goal of continual improvement. This framework has been used 11 to restructure the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines into a TQM risk management approach that will 12 provide consumers with the means for judging whether their water provider is functioning as safely and best practice to the regulatory authority. The TQM approach is not intended to replace an effective 18 regulatory process that must be accountable to the public, only to improve the manner in which 19 constructive improvements are achieved.
20
Now that the framework is being adopted in Australia, more detailed supporting documents are 21 being developed to guide its implementation for individual water utilities. The core capacity of this 22 approach to deliver risk management for the purposes of assuring drinking water safety is found in the 23 second and third elements of the Framework: 2. Assessment of the Drinking Water System; and 3. • Risk is the likelihood of identified hazards causing harm in exposed populations in a specified 5 time frame, including the magnitude of that harm and the consequences.
6
These concepts can be illustrated with a pathogen. Cryptosporidium is a hazard for any surface water 7 system because it is always potentially present given its occurrence in human sewage and/or livestock 8 wastes. A challenge to a water system by a waste source containing Cryptosporidium such as a sewage 9 spill is a hazardous event. The risk associated with Cryptosporidium is the likelihood that this pathogen 10 will pass through the treatment system to reach consumers in an infectious state and in numbers sufficient 11 to cause illness.
12
An important contribution for implementing this element of a risk management approach is a The extent of experience captured in this reference is illustrated by the range of 36 hazard fact sheets and 24 seven case studies that are provided (Table 2) . • inactivation of microorganisms in the water; and
10
• maintenance of the quality of the water during distribution.
11
This approach is meant to ensure that these barriers are present and functional to minimize the 12 chance of failure that would give rise to "events." It was adopted on the premise that small water 13 operators could relate better to the tangible concept of an event rather than a hazard, which some 14 operators find to be more hypothetical. Currently, the NZMOH has produced 40 specific, practical guides 
1.
Produce an overview of the supply and decide which of the PHRMP guides are needed.
5.
Decide where improvements should be made in the supply to better protect public health.
23
6. Decide on the order in which improvements need to be made.
24
7.
Draw up a timetable for making the improvements. 
11.
Decide on communication policy and needs.
29
The New Zealand system of Public Health Risk Management Plans are an excellent contribution towards 30 greater drinking water safety and deserve wider application.
Discussion
33
A clear message that emerges from the case studies is that the painful experience at locations happened 600 km to the west.
8
In another case, Orangeville, a community only one hour away from Walkerton, experienced a 
13
There are several key aspects of waterborne pathogens that characterize the challenge they pose 14 to drinking water safety. Some of these are readily evident from the outbreak case studies:
15
• Fecal (human or animal) contamination can be found wherever humans, their domestic animals 16 or wildlife reside; although exposure is reduced as sanitation and waste management are 17 improved, complete elimination of potential exposure to fecal contamination is not possible.
18
• Loading of pathogens into a drinking water system sufficient to cause outbreaks of disease will 19 not be consistent, rather it will be intermittent and infrequent when higher levels of sanitation are 20 achieved. As a result, extended periods without apparent problems do not guarantee future 21 safety.
22
• Pathogens are likely to be heterogeneously distributed in water because of their origin in fecal 23 particles that will not be totally dispersed in receiving waters and because of clumping promoted 24 in treatment processes.
25
• Some pathogens have high infectivity, which, combined with a likelihood of pathogens
• Some pathogens (e.g. Cryptosporidium) are resistant to chemical disinfection, making fine 1 particle removal and alternative disinfection processes, such as UV, critical elements of a 2 multiple-barrier approach.
3
• Conditions that create a pathogen challenge to the treatment process are often event-driven (e.g.
4
extreme weather, unusual operating conditions), meaning that such events should be recognized 5 as potential triggers of trouble.
6
• Multiple failures in a system must usually combine for disaster to occur, particularly as more 7 barriers are made effective in seeking higher degrees of safety. This reality also means that one 8 or more barriers can be failing and ineffective without an outbreak occurring. This makes the 9 independent evaluation of treatment performance by measures such as turbidity or chlorine 10 residual monitoring a necessary activity to assure that all of the multiple barriers are effective.
12
Many of these challenges are intuitive for experienced drinking water professionals, but they are 
22
• Monitoring for pathogens and useful indicators cannot be achieved in real time.
23
• Monitoring methods cannot be directly interpreted for public health significance because the 24 viability and infectivity for most pathogens is usually not determined by routine methods.
25
• Interpretation of monitoring results will be challenged by a preponderance of false positives 26 because of the low frequency of pathogen hazards (Hrudey & Leiss, 2003) .
27
• Population health surveillance is insensitive and is likely blind to low-level endemic disease and 28 all but the largest outbreaks.
29
• Adaptation and tolerance (immunity) in resident populations may hide local, chronic problems 1 while leaving visitors vulnerable to infection that may be difficult to trace back to the source, 2 particularly in resort communities.
4
Despite the challenges and limitations, the best drinking water providers have shown an ability 5 to respond to a wide range of challenges with effective prevention programs. The processes in these 6 organizations may bend under stress, but they do not break, so failures are not allowed to accumulate to 7 the point where they can impact the health of a consumer. An optimal preventive approach will be 8 creative and forward-looking:
9
• Informed vigilance is actively promoted and rewarded.
10
• Understanding of the entire system, its challenges and limitations is promoted and actively 11 maintained.
12
• Effective, real-time treatment process control, based on understanding critical capabilities and
13
limitations of the technology, is the basic operating approach.
14
• Fail-safe multi-barriers are actively identified and maintained at a level appropriate to the 15 challenges facing the system.
16
• Close calls are documented and used to train staff about how the system responded under stress
17
and to identify what measures are needed to make such close calls less likely in future.
18
• Operators, supervisors, lab personnel and management all understand that they are entrusted 19 with protecting the public's health and are committed to honouring that responsibility above all 20 else.
21
• Operational personnel are afforded the status, training and remuneration commensurate with 22 their responsibilities as guardians of the public's health.
23
• Response capability and communication are improved, particularly as post 9-11 bioterrorism 24 concerns are being addressed.
25
• An overall continuous improvement, total quality management (TQM) mentality will pervade 26 the organization. 
Conclusions
Risk management approaches offer a means to benefit from the experience of past failures. A water is a remarkable bargain for consumers and should be valued much more highly than commonly 5 occurs in our affluent societies. 
